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JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ADMINISTRATIVE "REASON TO
BELIEVE"
The cardinal principle of the relationship between courts and
administrative agencies is that agency action is presumably subject
to judicial review.1 This presumption applies unless Congress
clearly and unambiguously intends to withhold review or commit
the action to agency discretion.2 Thus, the question involved when
agency action is challenged in the courts generally is not whether,
but when, judicial review will be exercised.
In order to prevent premature interference with the administra-
tive process, courts employ the often overlapping doctrines of ripe-
ness,' finality," and exhaustion of administrative remedies5 to deny
1. See Morris v. Gressette, 432 U.S. 491 (1977); Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v.
Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971); Association of Data Processing Serv. Org. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150
(1970); Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159 (1970); Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136 (1967).
See generally 5 B. MEZINES, J. STEIN & J. GRUFF, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 44.01 (1978); L.
JAFFEE, JU-DICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 339-53 (abr. ed. 1965); Note, Jurisdic-
tion to Review Federal Administrative Action: District Court or Court of Appeals, 88
HAnv. L. REv. 980 (1975).
2. Administrative Procedure Act § 10(a), 5 U.S.C. § 701(a) (1976). See also Abbott Labs.
v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 140-41 (1967); Rusk v. Cort, 369 U.S. 367, 379-80 (1962); L. JAF-
FEE, supra note 1, at 336-59.
These two exceptions to the presumption of reviewability are to be narrrowly construed.
Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 410 (1971). See generally K.
DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIWE LAW OF THE SEVENTIES § 28.16 (1976); L. JAFFEE, supra note 1, at
375; Berger, Administrative Arbitrariness: A Synthesis, 78 YALE L.J. 965 (1969); Saferstem,
Nonreviewability: A Functional Analysis of "Committed to Agency Discretion", 82 HAv.
L. REv. 367 (1968).
3. [The] basic rationale [of the ripeness doctrine] is to prevent the courts, through avoid-
ance of premature adjudication, from entangling themselves in abstract disagreements
over administrative policies, and also to protect the agencies from judicial interference
until an administrative decision has been formalized and its effects felt m a concrete
way by the challenging parties.
Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148-49 (1967); see L. JAFFEE, supra note 1, at 395-
416. See generally Note, Reviewability of Administrative Action: The Elusive Search for a
Pragmatic Standard, 1974 DUKE L.J. 382.
4. Finality essentially is an element in the determination of ripeness. Abbott Labs. v.
Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 150-56 (1967). Final agency action is a statutory prerequisite for
review under the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 704 (1976). See notes 129-36
infra.
5. See McGee v. United States, 402 U.S. 479, 483-86 (1971); McKart v. United States, 395
U.S. 185, 193-94 (1969). See generally K. DAVIs, supra note 2, at 446-68; L. JAFFEE, supra
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judicial review. Application of these concepts by the courts in-
volves balancing the mconvenience and cost of piecemeal review
against the hardship to the parties of withholding review.6 Courts,
therefore, should apply these doctrines pragmatically;7 the applica-
tion of the doctrines should not cause the loss of valid claims and
thus destroy the presumption of judicial review.'
In FTC v. Standard Oil Co. of California,9 the Supreme Court
addressed the appropriateness of interlocutory review of a com-
plaint issued by the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) against the
nation's eight major oil companies for violation of the Federal
Trade Commission Act (FTCA).' 0 Standard Oil of California (SO-
CAL) alleged that issuance of the complaint violated a statutory
restriction on the FTC's discretion and was therefore unlawful.
The Supreme Court held that the issuance of a complaint was not
"final agency action" and was thus unreviewable until completion
of the agency's adjudication."'
This Comment will explore the finality doctrine and underlying
principles of judicial review of agency action and will conclude that
Standard Oil may have been decided wrongly The Court applied
finality criteria in a mechanical rather than pragmatic fashion and
thereby caused the loss of a crucial statutory claim to freedom
from arbitrary agency action. In practice, the Court's decision insu-
lates an unlawfully instituted complaint from judicial review and
abrogates the essential function of judicial review in assuring the
regularity of the administrative process. By its narrow application
of finality, the Court avoided the critical questions presented by
Standard Oil: the limits on, and reviewability of, agency
discretion.
note 1, at 424-58.
6. Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 149 (1967). See also Gillespie v. United States
Steel Corp., 379 U.S. 148, 152-53 (1964); Dickinson v. Petroleum Conversion Corp., 338 U.S.
507, 511 (1950).
7. Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 149 (1967). See also Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacque-
lin, 417 U.S. 156, 170 (1974); Gillespie v. United States Steel Corp., 379 U.S. 148, 152 (1964);
Joint Anti-Facist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 156 (1951) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurrring).
8. Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 331 n.11 (1976).
9. 101 S. Ct. 488 (1980).
10. 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1976).
11. 101 S. Ct. at 493.
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FTC v. STANDARD OIL Co. OF CALIFORNIA
In July 1973, the FTC issued a complaint against SOCAL and
seven other oil companies for violation of section 5 of the FTCA.12
The complaint issued pursuant to section 5(b) of the FTCA, which
provides:
Whenever the Commission shall have reason to believe that
any such person, partnership, or corporation has been or is using
any unfair method of competition and if it shall appear to
the Commission that a proceeding by it would be in the
interest of the public, it shall issue . a complaint stating its
charges in that respect.13
In January 1974, SOCAL filed a motion with the FTC requesting
that the FTC either withdraw or dismiss the complaint. SOCAL
alleged that the FTC prematurely terminated its investigation into
the oil industry and that the FTC issued the complaint solely as a
result of political pressure from Congress. 14 SOCAL argued that
12. 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1976). The other seven respondents were Exxon Corp., Texaco, Inc.;
Gulf Oil Corp., Mobil Oil Corp., Standard Oil Co. of Indiana; Shell Oil Corp., and Atlantic
Richfield Co. In re Exxon Corp., 83 F.T.C. 1759 (1974). See generally Comment, FTC v.
The Petroleum Industry: The Need for Consistent Regulatory Policy, 24 BuF. L. REv. 761
(1975).
13. 15 U.S.C. § 45(b) (1976) (emphasis added).
14. SOCAL alleged that, on December 21, 1971, the FTC issued a resolution stating its
intention to institute an investigation of possible unfair trade practices in the petroleum
industry. For 17 months the FTC made no effort to investigate SOCAL. On May 31, 1973,
before any investigation of SOCAL had been conducted, Sen. Jackson wrote to the FTC,
requesting a report within 30 days on the possible involvement of the oil companies in caus-
mg the 1973 oil shortages. The FTC immediately subpoenaed three SOCAL officers to tes-
tify. On June 27, a newspaper story, citing "congressional sources," reported that the FTC
was about to bring an anti-trust action against the oil companies. On July 6, the FTC issued
a subpoena duces tecum directing SOCAL to produce corporate records. On the same day,
the FTC sent to Sen. Jackson a "Preliminary Federal Trade Commission Staff Report on Its
Investigation of the Petroleum Industry," noting that the report had not been evaluated by
the Commission and requesting that it not be made public. On July 9, Sen. Jackson notified
the Commission that he intended to publish the report as a congressional committee reprint
unless the FTC explained why publication would be improper. Petition for Cert., app. at 6-
9, FTC v. Standard Oil Co. of Cal. 101 S. Ct. 488 (1976). On July 11, the FTC replied that
the report was merely an "internal staff memorandum" and that "[d]isclosure of such a
document to Congress must be contrasted with its public release, which the Committee
views as inconsistent with its duty to proceed judiciously and responsibly in aetermmmg
what, if any, action should be taken on the basis of the staff investigation," thereby imply-
ing that no decision to act had been made. Id. at 9. On July 13, Sen. Jackson released the
report. On the second business day thereafter the FTC issued a new release stating that
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the "reason to believe" language of section 5 of the FTCA created
a statutory restriction upon the exercise of the Commission's dis-
cretion, and that by instituting the complaint for political reasons,
without completing its investigation and without substantial evi-
dence of a violation, the Commission violated a specific limitation
embodied in the Act.15 Therefore, SOCAL maintained, the com-
plaint was unlawful.
The FTC denied SOCAL's motion to dismiss the complaint.
1 6
SOCAL then applied for reconsideration, which also was denied.17
In October 1974, the administrative law judge recommended that
the FTC withdraw its complaint pending further investigation, but
they were filing a complaint. Id.
After the FTC issued the complaint, the Office of Energy Advisor of the Treasury Depart-
ment issued an analysis of the complaint and the investigative report, stating that the FTC
was wrong and that the complaint should be withdrawn. On August 30, 1973, the FTC sup-
plied all the evidence it had compiled to Sen. Jackson for a congressional inquiry. At the
conclusion of the hearings, Sen. Jackson stated that no "hard evidence" existed to indicate
oil company involvement m the oil shortage. Id. at 11.
Furthermore, on May 7, 1974, in response to an order by the administrative law judge,
FTC counsel admitted that they "had no intention whatever regarding specific evidence to
be used at trial," that they could not list a single witness that they intended to call at trial,
and that the "great majority of documents which we expect to offer at trial are not in our
possession but will be obtained through forthcoming discovery." Id. at 12. On October 24,
1974, the administrative law judge recommended that in light of discovery problems the
FTC withdraw the complaint pending further investigation. Id. at 13.
15. 101 S. Ct. at 490-91.
16. Id. at 490 n.5.
17. In re Exxon Corp., 83 F.T.C. 1759 (1974). The Commission noted:
[T]he adequacy of the Commission's "reason to believe" a violation of the law
has occurred [goes] to the mental processes of the Commissioners and will
not be reviewed by the courts. Once the Commission has resolved these ques-
tions and issued a complaint, the issue to be litigated is not the adequacy of
the Commission's pre-complaint information or the diligence of its study of the
material in question but whether the alleged violation had in fact occurred.
Id. at 1760. But see Dunlop v. Bachowski, 421 U.S. 560, 571 (1975). ("[T]o enable the re-
viewing court intelligently to review the Secretary's determination, the Secretary must pro-
vide a statement of reasons supporting his determination. [The reasons must be
sufficient to show whether] 'the discretion has been exercised in a manner that is
neither arbitrary nor capricious.' ") (quoting DeVito v. Shultz, 300 F Supp. 381, 383 (D.D.C.
1969) (De Vito I)); Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402,420 (1971)
("The court may require the administrative officials who participated in the decision to give
testimony explaining their action."); Singer Sewing Mach. Co. v. NLRB, 329 F.2d 200, 208
(4th Cir. 1964) ("[Wlhere a prima facie case of misconduct is shown, justice requires that
the mental process rule be held inapplicable.").
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the FTC again refused.18
Having exhausted its administrative remedies regarding with-
drawal of the complaint,19 SOCAL filed suit in the United States
District Court for the Northern District of California for a declara-
tory judgment that the complaint was issued unlawfully.20 The dis-
trict court dismissed the complaint on the grounds that the court
lacked the authority to interpret the term "reason to believe."'"
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that,
although a determination of reason to believe that a violation of
the FTCA had occurred is committed to agency discretion by law,
the district court could inquire into whether the FTC actually
made the "reason to believe" determination before issuing a com-
plaint.22 The Supreme Court then reversed the court of appeals
and dismissed SOCAL's complaint.2 3
FTC v. Standard Oil Co. of California involved two issues: first,
whether SOCAL's claim was ripe for review; and second, whether
the decision to institute a complaint was reviewable, or was com-
mitted to agency discretion. Applying the criteria of ripeness and
finality established by the Supreme Court in Abbot Laboratories v.
Gardner,24 the Court held that the issuance of the complaint was
not final agency action, and therefore was unreviewable until com-
pletion of the agency's adjudication.25 The Court thus avoided de-
ciding the crucial issue: whether SOCAL was entitled to judicial
review of. the issuance of an allegedly unlawful complaint. For rea-
sons discussed below the Court permanently insulated the FTC ac-
tion from judicial review.
THE RiPENESS DOcTRINE
The Abbott Laboratories Criteria
In Standard Oil, the Court primarily relied upon application of
18. See note 14 supra.
19. 101 S. Ct. at 495.
20. Petition for Cert., app. at 3-4, FTC v. Standard Oil Co. of Cal., 101 S. Ct. 488 (1976).
21. Id. at 51-52.
22. Standard Oil Co. of Cal. v. FTC, 596 F.2d 1381, 1385-86 (9th Cir. 1979).
23. 101 S. Ct. at 496-97.
24. 387 U.S. 136 (1967).
25. 101 S. Ct. at 493.
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the finality criteria established in Abbott Laboratories v. Gard-
ner 26 In Abbott Laboratories, drug manufacturers challenged a la-
beling order promulgated by the Commissioner of Food and
Drugs.27 The Court reasoned that a determination of whether ad-
ministrative action is ripe for review involves an evaluation of the
fitness of the issues for review and the hardship imposed on the
parties by withholding review until a final order issues.28 Deter-
mining the fitness of the issues for review further requires inquiry
into whether the issue presented is a legal one and whether the
agency action is final.29
In Abbott Laboratories, the manufacturers alleged that the
Commissioner misconstrued the enabling act and lacked the au-
thority to issue the order.30 The Court concluded that the question
of statutory interpretation was a purely legal issue, 1 and even
without attempted enforcement of the order, the order was final
agency action.32
The Supreme Court in Abbott Laboratories stated that the final-
ity doctrine requires that finality be determined pragmatically 33
The Court then noted several factors that indicated the agency ac-
tion was final. First, the Court noted that the order was promul-
gated in a formal manner and was definitive; the manufacturers
were expected to comply.3 4 Second, the order resulted in direct and
immediate impact upon the parties; they either had to expend
26. Abbott Laboratories is the leading case on finality of agency action. K. DAvis, supra
note 2, at 159 (Supp. 1977).
27. The order required that drug labels and advertising include the generic name of the
drug every time its trade name was used. 387 U.S. at 137-38.
28. Id. at 148-49; see cases cited note 6 supra.
29. Id. at 149.
30. Id. at 139.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id. See Gillespie v. United States Steel Corp., 379 U.S. 148 (1964). The Court stated:
[O]ur cases have long recognized that whether a ruling is "final" is fre-
quently so close a question that decision of that issue either way can be sup-
ported with equally forceful arguments, and that it is impossible to devise a
formula to resolve all marginal cases coming within what might well be called
the "twilight zone" of finality. Because of this difficulty this Court has held
that the requirement of finality is to be given a "practical rather than a techni-
cal construction."
Id. at 152 (quoting Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 545 (1948)).
34. 387 U.S. at 151.
[Vol. 23:139
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large sums to change their business conduct or face prosecution.3 5
Third, the Court recognized that the drug manufacturers were en-
gaged in a sensitive industry in which public confidence in their
product was essential. The prospect of a government enforcement
action might impose irreparable harm upon the manufacturers'
businesses. 6 Finally, the Court concluded that pre-enforcement re-
view would not impede or interfere with the administrative action;
rather, review would speed enforcement of the order.
37
The Court devoted considerable attention to the possibility of
interference with administrative enforcement. The government ar-
gued that judicial review would lead to a multiplicity of suits chal-
lenging every regulation, but the Court emphasized that sufficient
safeguards existed to prevent impairment of the agency process.
38
The courts may consolidate suits, stay other suits pending the out-
come of the case, or dismiss a suit for declaratory judgement if the
same issue is pending in another jurisdiction.3 9 Furthermore, de-
claratory judgment is generally in the nature of an equitable rem-
edy, and if plaintiffs file a multiplicity of suits merely "to harass
the Government or to delay enforcement," 40 a court can deny relief
on the ground of delay or harassment alone.41 Most important, the
Court emphasized that institution of a declaratory judgment action
does not stay the effectiveness of the agency order pending the
outcome of judicial review.42
Thus, Abbott Laboratories provides a useful synthesis of the
doctrines of ripeness and finality. The factors applied were not de-
clared to be preclusive, but the decision embodies presumptions
and principles that appear throughout the Court's application of
the ripeness standards. 43 Therefore, the critical question in Stan-
35. Id. at 152.
36. Id. at 153.
37. Id. at 154-55.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 155.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 155-56.
43. As the Supreme Court stated in Dickinson v. Petroleum Conversion Corp., 338 U.S.
507 (1950), the struggle of the courts m dealing with the concept of finality is:
[S]ometimes to devise a formula that will encompass all situations and at other
times to take hardship cases out from under the rigidity of previous declara-
1981]
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dard Oil is whether the Supreme Court, applying the finality doc-
trine in a pragmatic fashion, properly balanced the principle of ad-
ministrative effectiveness against hardship and injustice to the
parties.
Ripeness Doctrine Applied: Finality
Analysis of the Supreme Court's application of the ripeness doc-
trine m Standard Oil reveals that the Court ignored the balancing
principles embodied in the doctrine. The Court focused on distin-
guishing the facts of Abbott Laboratories and refused to consider
the broader implications of the ripeness doctrine.
First, the Court decided that, unlike the FDA order in Abbott
Laboratories, the issuance of a complaint by the FTC was not a
definitive statement of the Commission's position on whether SO-
CAL violated the FTCA.44 Because the issue of whether the law
was violated was subject to agency adjudication, the Court held
that averment of a reason to believe was merely a prerequisite to a
definitive agency position that results from completion of the
agency proceeding.45 The Court admitted, however, that the issu-
ance of the complaint was definitive on the issue of whether the
FTC had reason to believe that a violation had occurred. 46 By rec-
ognizmg that the FTC's rejection of SOCAL's motion to dismiss
was definitive on the question of whether the agency prior to issu-
ing the complaint had reason to believe that SOCAL violated the
FTCA, the Court apparently misconstrued the substance of SO-
CAL's complaint. The issue in the case was not whether SOCAL
violated the FTCA, as the Court implied.47 Instead, the issue was
tions; sometimes choosing one and sometimes another of the considerations
that always compete in the question of appealability, the most important of
which are the inconvenience and costs of piecemeal review on the one hand
and the danger of denying justice by delay on the other.
Id. at 511.
44. 101 S. Ct. at 493-94.
45. Id. at 494.
46. Id. at 493-94 & n.9.
47. Id. By stating that the FTC's decision was merely a prerequisite to a definitive state-
ment of whether SOCAL had violated the FTCA, the Court focuses on the FTC's substan-
tive decision on the merits of SOCAL's violation. The Court views the FTC decision on the
merits as the definitive ruling at issue in the case, not the antecedent question of the FTC's
compliancce with the FTCA when it brought the complaint.
[Vol. 23:139
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whether the FTC violated a statutory limitation of its discretion-
ary authority by issuing a complaint without the requisite reason
to believe. Therefore, the abuse of discretion issue must be decided
before any decision on the merits of the case.48 The Court, how-
ever, mistakenly concludes that the FTC's issuance of the com-
plaint is definitive as to whether the FTC had a reason to believe
the FTCA had been violated. Instead, the Court should have
granted review to determine whether the FTC had reason to be-
lieve before it issued the complaint.
The Court further held that the issuance of a complaint has no
legal force or effect comparable to the order in Abbott Laborato-
ries, in which the drug manufacurers were required to change their
advertising practices, or risk criminal or civil penalties.49 In Stan-
dard Oil, the FTC complaint merely imposed on the oil companies
the burden of responding to the agency's charges; the action in-
volved no changes in the companies' conduct.50 A distinction exists
between the two situations, but the distinction perhaps is not as
great as the Court suggests. In Abbott Laboratories, the harm to
the drug manufacturers was twofold. First, the manufacturers
would have suffered pecuniary loss, either by changing their labels
or risking assessment of penalties. 1 Second, by risking prosecu-
tion, they also chanced serious damage to their reputations.5 2 Simi-
larly, responding to an unlawfully issued FTC complaint imposes a
twofold harm upon SOCAL and the other respondents. The oil
companies estimated that compliance with the first discovery re-
quests would require over 1500 man-years of effort at an expense
in excess of forty million dollars.53 Furthermore, if the issuance of
the complaint was inspired politically to create the impression that
a violation had occurred, the oil companies might suffer the stigma
of being labeled conspirators in monopolisitic practices and con-
trivers of the 1973 oil shortages.
48. See Mercantile Nat'1 Bank v. Langdeau, 371 U.S. 555 (1963); Jewell Companes, Inc.
v. FTC, 432 F.2d 1155 (7th Cir. 1970); Elmo Div. of Drive-X Co. v. Dixon, 348 F.2d 342
(D.C. Cir. 1965).
49. 101 S. Ct. at 494.
50. Id.
51. 387 U.S. at 152-53.
52. Id. at 153.
53. Standard Oil Co. of Ind. v. FTC, 475 F Supp. 1261, 1265 (N.D. Ind. 1979).
19811
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Finally, the Court attempted to distinguish Abbott Laboratories
by discussing the practical effects of judicial review on the admin-
istrative process." The Court reasoned that, unlike the situation in
Abbott Laboratories, review of SOCAL's claim would delay ulti-
mate resolution of the question of whether the oil companies vio-
lated the FTCA 5 In addition, the Court noted that if it allowed
review every respondent to an FTC complaint could make the
same claim, thus impairing the agency's ability to function. 6 In
finding these concerns determinative on the finality issue, the
Court ignored the ameliorative judicial tools it had used to brush
aside identical objections in Abbott Laboratories57 and failed to fo-
cus on the critical inquiry: whether the FTC, not SOCAL, violated
the FTCA.
SOCAL sought a narrow scope of review. The only question
presented was whether the FTC made a determination before issu-
ing a complaint that it had reason to believe that the law was vio-
lated. 8 Thus, SOCAL's claim presents a relatively simple factual
and legal question which the courts could determine expedi-
tiously '9 Because regularity of the administrative process is pre-
sumed,60 unless the FTC routinely mitiates complaints without a
reason to believe a violation of the law has occurred, little danger
exists of the multiplicity of suits that the Court fears.61
Additionally, by applying the ameliorative factors discussed by
the Court in Abbott Laboratories, review would not delay, and in
all likelihood would hasten, resolution of the case on the merits.
54. 101 S. Ct. at 494.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. 387 U.S. at 154-56.
58. Standard Oil Co. of Cal. v. FTC, 596 F.2d 1381, 1386 (1979).
59. Id; see Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971); Jewell
Companies, Inc. v. FTC, 432 F.2d 1155 (7th Cir. 1970).
60. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 415 (1971); see Pacific
States Box & Basket Co. v. White, 296 U.S. 176, 185 (1935); United States v. Chemical
Foundation, 272 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1926).
61. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 415 (1971) ("[Tlhat
presumption [of regularity] is not to shield [agency] action from a thorough, probing,
rn-depth review."). See K. DAvis, supra note 2, at 316-25. If the FTC routinely institutes
unlawful complaints, the impact on administrative proceedings should be of little concern in
light of the overriding judicial interest in assuring compliance with statutory and constitu-
tional norms.
[Vol. 23:139
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Application of factors enunciated in Abbott Laboratories mini-
mizes the danger of the use 9f judicial review to impair agency ac-
tion and fulfills a function of judicial review: assuring the regular-
ity of the administrative process. Several other lawsuits, most
involving legal and factual issues identical to those in Standard
Oil, were filed as a result of the FTC complaint.62 Arguably, con-
solidation of these cases and timely judicial resolution or dismissal
of the complaint pending further investigation could expedite in-
quiry into the merits of the FTC's charges .8  Furthermore, as the
Court noted in Abbott Laboratories, judicial review of SOCAL's
claim does not stay the FTC proceeding." Thus, the agency's adju-
dication continues while the court evaluates whether the FTC
complied with the FTCA in filing the complaint. If the court deter-
mines that the FTC has acted unlawfully, then the proceeding ter-
62. Standard Oil Co. of Ind. v. FTC, No. H-78-483 (N.D. Ind. June 24, 1980); Exxon Corp.
v. FTC, 476 F Supp. 713 (D.D.C. 1979); Standard Oil Co. of Ind. v. FTC, 475 F Supp. 1261
(N.D. Ind. 1979); Exxon Corp. v. FTC, 466 F Supp. 1088 (D.D.C. 1978); In re FTC Line of
Business Report Litigation, 595 F.2d 685 (D.C. Cir.), cert. dented, 439 U.S. 958 (1978); FTC
v. Anderson, 442 F Supp. 1118 (D.D.C. 1977); Exxon Corp. v. FTC, 436 F. Supp. 1012 (D.
Del. 1977); Mobil Oil Corp. v. FTC, 430 F Supp. 855 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd, 562 F.2d 170 (2d Cir.
1977); Mobil Oil Corp. v. FTC, 406 F Supp. 305 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); Atlantic Richfield Co. v.
FTC, 398 F Supp. 1 (S.D. Tex. 1975), afl'd, 546 F.2d 646 (5th Cir. 1977); Exxon Corp. v.
FTC, 384 F Supp. 755 (D.D.C. 1974), remanded, 527 F.2d 1386 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
Obviously, the Court is concerned with the practical effect of this voluminous litigation on
the agency proceeding. In addition to the suits cited, the oil companies filed over 425 mo-
tions in the FTC adjudication. Standard Oil Co. of Ind. v. FTC, 475 F Supp. at 1265 n.10.
Of course, the extensive motion practice and multiple suits may be a direct result of the
failure of the FTC to build its case prior to issuing the complaint and the FTC's almost
exclusive reliance on post-complaint discovery. The procedural restrictions on agency dis-
covery are much more stringent in an adjudicatory proceeding than in an investigation; thus
the agency's legal difficulties may result directly from premature termination of the investi-
gation. As the administrative law judge in the FTC proceeding noted in his recommendation
to dismiss the complaint:
The continuation, within the existing adjudicative framework, of the "discov-
ery" proposed by complaint counsel poses serious problems that require resolu-
tion. In view of these circumstances, the Commission may want to consider, as
an alternative, the withdrawal of the case from adjudication so that it
may be more fully investigated without the restrictions imposed by the ex-
isting rules governing adjudicative proceedings.
Petition for Cert., app. at 14, FTC v. Standard Oil Co. of Cal., 101 S. Ct. 488 (1980); see All-
State Indus. Inc., 72 F.T.C. 1020 (1967). See generally Gelhorn & Larsen, Interlocutory
Appeal Procedures in Administrative Hearings, 70 MICH. L. Ray. 109, 128-29 (1971).
63. See note 62 supra.
64. 387 U.S. at 155-56.
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minmates at a relatively early stage, preventing the waste of agency
and private resources while preserving the integrity of the adminis-
trative system. 5 If the court determines that the FTC issued the
complaint lawfully, the agency proceeding continues and no delay
is experienced. This assures that agency adjudication will be in ac-
cordance with the law and militates against the filing of unfounded
claims by eliminating the possible benefit of delay.
Ripeness Doctrine Applied: Irreparable Harm
The core principle of the ripeness doctrine is that considerations
of ripeness must balance administrative convenience and efficiency
against the hardship to the parties if the court withholds review. 0
By so narrowly distinguishing the facts of Abbott Laboratories, the
Court placed unwarranted emphasis on the factors of admmistra-
tive convenience and ignored the possibly irreparable harm to SO-
CAL by withholding review.
SOCAL contended that denial of review before completion of the
agency's adjudication insulated the unlawful issuance of the com-
plaint from review at any stage, causing irreparable harm. 7 If, af-
ter completion of the agency proceedings, the FTC does not find a
violation of the law, SOCAL's claim becomes moot. 8 If the FTC
finds a violation, SOCAL will be unable to obtain review of the
lawfulness of the issuance of the complaint. Because the FTC de-
med SOCAL discovery into the agency decision to issue the com-
plaint, SOCAL cannot build a factual record to present for judicial
review. 9 Moreover, after the agency issues a cease and desist or-
der, the reviewing court focuses primarily on the substantiality of
the FTC's decision on the merits of whether SOCAL violated the
FTCA.70
In response to SOCAL's mootness argument, the Court held
65. See Gillespie v. United States Steel Corp., 379 U.S. 148, 153 (1964); Mercantile Nat'l
Bank v. Langdeau, 371 U.S. 555, 558 (1963).
66. Dickinson v. Petroleum Conversion Corp., 338 U.S. 507, 511 (1950); see Abbott Labs.
v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 149 (1967); Gillespie v. United States Steel Corp., 379 U.S. 148,
152-53 (1964).
67. 101 S. Ct. at 495; see Standard Oil Co. of Cal. v. FTC, 596 F.2d 1381, 1387 (1979).
68. 101 S. Ct. at 495 n.11.
69. Id. at 495.
70. Id.
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that, because the ripeness doctrine purports to prevent judicial in-
terference in the administrative process, the possibility that SO-
CAL's complaint might become moot presented a compelling rea-
son to refrain from interlocutory review.7 1 Although rebognizing
that defense expenses burdened SOCAL, the Court noted that
"[m]ere litigation expense, even substantial and unrecoupable cost,
does not constitute irreparable injury.1 7 2 The Court's position
amounts to virtual license to initiate unlawful adjudicative pro-
ceedings with impunity The Court admonished the agency that
"[b]y this holding, we do not encourage the issuance of complaints
...without a conscientious compliance with the 'reason to be-
lieve' obligation in 15 U.S.C. § 45(b),' '7 3 but judicial admonishment
in the face of unlawful agency action is a weak substitute for effec-
tive judicial review.
If the FTC, upon completion of its proceeding, finds a violation
of the FTCA, SOCAL's inability to present an adequate record of
its claim of lack of reason to believe presents substantial difficulty.
71. Id. at 495 n.11. The Court cites McGee v. United States, 402 U.S. 479 (1971), and
McKart v. United Sttates, 395 U.S. 185 (1969), to support this proposition. Both of these
cases involved the failure of selective service registrants to exhaust administrative remedies
before requesting judicial review. As the Court noted in McGee, however.
[Tihe contention that the rigors of the exhaustion doctrine should be relaxed
is not to be met by mechanical recitation of the broad interests usually served
by the doctrine, but rather should be assessed in light of a discrete analysis of
the particular default in question, to see whether there is "a governmental in-
terest compelling enough" to justify the forfeiting of judicial review.
402 U.S. at 485 (quoting McKart v. United States, 395 U.S. at 197) (emphasis added). In
Standard Oil, the Supreme Court failed to make this assessment. In McKart, the Court
stated that "[none] of the other cases decided by this Court, stand for the propostion that
the exhaustion doctrine must be applied blindly m every case." 395 U.S. at 200-01 (footnote
omitted). Moreover, in McKart, where the draft board had an opportunity to make a deter-
mination of the registrant's status, the Court held that exhaustion was not required. Id. at
197.
72. 101 S. Ct. at 495 (citing Renegotiation Bd. v. Bannercraft Clothing Co., 415 U.S. 1, 24
(1974)). But see Mercantile Nat'l Bank v. Langdeau, 371 U.S. 555 (1963); L. JAPF, supra
note 1, at 429. Professor Jaffee notes:
Mere litigation expense, even considerable and unrecoupable expenses is
not "irreparable injury." But of course financial loss as a result of forfeiture of
a right is. Large litigation expense, if avoidable, should figure in the
somewhat discretionary approach to exhaustion. It should figure as a
makeweight when there is a question whether the usual remedy is adequate or
not.
Id. (emphasis added).
73. 101 S. Ct. at 496 n.14.
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The Court noted that a record that is inadequate upon review can
be made adequate by taking additional evidence, 7 but that posi-
tion ignores the practical difficulties involved in developing a re-
cord for review long after the complaint is issued. At that point,
the evidence is stale and tainted because in the meantime the
agency has found a violation, whether or not a reason to believe
existed when the complaint issued.
Whether SOCAL can compile an adequate record is largely irrel-
evant, for although the Court held that a court of appeals has the
power upon final review of the order to review whether the FTC
complied with the law when the FTC issued the complaint,75 the
practical and legal problems attendant upon such a review make
exercise of that power unlikely 7 The Supreme Court declined to
propose a possible remedy for an otherwise valid cease and desist
order based on a complaint issued without a reason to believe
determination. 7
The Court's inability to decide this question underscores the un-
tenability of its holding. Clearly, a court would not allow SOCAL
to continue to violate the law. Faced with a choice between con-
deming the illegality of the agency, or the illegality of the oil com-
panies, a court probably will choose the latter.
The central issue in Standard Oil was whether an FTC com-
plaint issued for political purposes and possibly without a determi-
nation of a reason to believe the FTCA was violated is subject to
interlocutory judicial review. The Supreme Court reasoned that
the issuance of the complaint by the FTC demonstrated that the
FTC had reason to believe that the oil companies violated the
74. Id. at 495-96.
75. Id. at 496.
76. Id. at 498 (Stevens, J., concurring). Justice Stevens noted:
If the Commission ultimately prevails on the merits of its complaint, SOCAL
surely will not be granted immunity because the Commission did not uncover
the evidence of illegality until after the complaint was filed. On the other hand,
if SOCAL prevails, there will be no occasion to review the contention that it
now advances, because the only relief it seeks is a dismissal of the Commis-
sion's complaint. SOCAL is surely correct when it argues that unless review is
available now, meaningful review can never be had.
Id.
77. 101 S. Ct. at 496.
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FTCA.7 8 Moreover, the Court held that the issue was not subject to
judicial review until the FTC issued a final order.7 9 The result,
however, conflicts with the "core principle that statutorily created
finality requirements should . . be construed so as not to cause
crucial collateral claims to be lost and potentially irreparable inju-
ries to be suffered . . ."0 By its rigid application of finality crite-
ria, the Court caused the loss of a crucial statutory and constitu-
tional claim to freedom from arbitrary government action.
THE COLLATERAL ORDER DocTRINE
The Supreme Court's refusal to recognize the FTC's action as
"final" with regard to the reason to believe determination was not
totally dispositive of SOCAL's claim. The collateral order doctrine,
established by the Court in Cohen v. Beneficil Industrial Loan
Corp.,sl provides an exception to the general requirement of final-
ity. 2 Based on Cohen, SOCAL argued that the FTC's decision was
appealable as a collateral order.88 Cohen involved an appeal from a
district court's refusal to apply a state statute that required a
plaintiff in a stockholder derivative suit to post a security bond to
reimburse the defendant corporation for costs and expenses in the
event the defendant prevailed on the merits." Even though the
district court's order was not the final judgment in the proceeding,
the Supreme Court upheld interlocutory review.8 5
In Cohen the Court established three requirements for applica-
tion of the collateral order doctrine."' First, the decision must be a
78. Id. at 493-94; see In re Exxon Corp., 83 F.T.C. 1759 (1974).
79. 101 S. Ct. at 496.
80. Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 331 n.11 (1976). See generally Fuchs, Prereqw-
sites to Judicial Review of Agency Action, 51 IND. L.J. 817, 846-53 (1976).
81. 337 U.S. 541 (1949).
82. Cohen involved an appeal from a lower court order under the provisions of 28 U.S.C.
§ 1291. As the Supreme Court recognized in Standard Oil, the collateral order doctrine
applies equally to review of administrative action under the Administrative Procedure Act.
101 S. Ct. at 496; see Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 331 n.11 (1976); Community
Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 546 F.2d 1022, 1024-25 (D.C. Cir. 1976); 5 B. MEZINES, supra note
1, § 48.03(2); Note, Appealability in the Federal Courts, 75 HARv. L. Rnv. 351, 364-67
(1961).
83. 101 S. Ct. at 496.
84. 337 U.S. at 543.
85. Id. at 557.
86. Id. at 546-47; see United States v. Griffin, 617 F.2d 1342 (9th Cir. 1980); 5 B. MazINmS,
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complete and final determination of the issue. 7 Because the deci-
sion of the district court with respect to the security bond was
closed and not subject to further reconsideration at trial, the Court
held that the ruling was final.a8 Second, the decision cannot be
merely a step toward final judgment on the merits into which the
decision will merge.' The decision must be collateral to, and sepa-
rable from, the rights asserted in the action. 0 This separability re-
qurement serves two functions: it prevents duplication of review
by the appellate court because the same evidence will not be rele-
vant to the disputed decision and the final claim for relief,91 and it
permits the trial to continue while the appeal is pursued.92 In Co-
hen, even though the applicability of the statute was the disposi-
tive issue and a ruling adverse to the plaintiffs would result in
withdrawal of the complaint, the Court held that the district court
order did not affect the disposition of the merits of the case and
would not merge into the final judgment.93 Finally, the right as-
serted must present an important issue that will be lost if post-
poned until final judgment.94 In Cohen, the Supreme Court rea-
soned that if review of the order were withheld until final
judgment, "it will be too late effectively to review the order,
and the rights conferred by the statute, if it is applicable, will have
been lost, probably irreparably ,,95
Applying the Cohen doctrine to claims of prosecutorial irregular-
ity similar to that charged by SOCAL, courts have upheld interloc-
utory review. For example, in Abney v. United States,96 the Su-
supra note 1, § 48.03(2).
87. 337 U.S. at 546.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Note, Appealability in the Federal Courts, 75 HARv. L. REV. 351, 364-67 (1961).
92. Id.
93. 337 U.S. at 546-47; see Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156 (1974) (Eisen in-
volved an appeal from a district court order imposing on the defendant 90% of the notice
costs m a class action suit. Even though resolution of the issue determined whether the suit
would be brought at all, the Court held that the question was antecedent to and unrelated
to the merits of the claim.); Mercantile Nat'l Bank v. Langdeau, 371 U.S. 555, 558 (1963)
(determination of proper venue).
94. 337 U.S. at 546-47.
95. Id. at 546.
96. 431 U.S. 651 (1977). Although Abney was a criminal action, the Court said that "Co-
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preme Court considered an appeal from a district court pretrial
order denying the petitioner's motion to dismiss on double jeop-
ardy grounds.9 Although the Court recognized that the lower
court's ruling was not final in the traditional sense, the Court
nonetheless permitted interlocutory review. 8 The Court noted that
final rejection of the defendant's double jeopardy claim by the dis-
trict court was complete and definitive; no further steps could be
taken in the district court to avoid trial.9 9 Moreover, the Court rea-
soned that the defendant's claim of prosecution m violation of his
rights, by its very nature, was separable from and collateral to the
issue of the defendant's guilt or innocence.100 The defendant
claimed a right not only to protection from double punishment,
but to freedom from double trials, and this right would be forfeited
if review awaited final judgment.10 1
In Unted States v. Griffin,1 0 2 the Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit addressed an interlocutory appeal from a district
court order denying the defendant's motion to dismiss on the
grounds of vindictive prosecution. Relying upon Abney, the court
concluded that the denial of the defendant's motion to dismiss was
a complete and final determination of the vindictive prosecution
claim in the trial court.10 3 The court also concluded that an allega'
tion of vindictive prosecution is separable from the issue of the
defendant's guilt or innocence, and that a vindictive prosecution
claim, like the double jeopardy claim in Abney, involves the right
not only to be free from conviction on the merits, but to be free
from the prosecution itself.1T ' "Thus, the vindictive prosecution
doctrine is a limit on prosecutorial discretion, and goes to the very
authority of the prosecution to hale the defendant into court in the
first place." 105 This right to freedom from abuse of prosecutorial
hen's collateral-order exception is equally applicable m both civil and crmnnal proceedings."
Id. at 659 n.4 (dictum).
97. Id.
98. Id. at 658-59.
99. Id. at 659.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. 617 F.2d 1342 (9th Cir. 1980).
103. Id. at 1345.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 1345-46; accord, Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 30 (1974); United States v.
1981]
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discretion would be lost irreparably if review were withheld.
In Elmo Division of Drve-X Co. v. Dixon,10 6 the Court of Ap-
peals for the District of Columbia reasoned that the decision of the
FTC to initiate a complaint in violation of an earlier consent de-
cree was reviewable on interlocutory appeal.1 07 The court con-
cluded that the type of procedural error that the respondent as-
serted was unrelated to and did not affect the agency's findings on
the merits. 108
Thus the courts have applied the collateral order doctrine to up-
hold interlocutory review in cases procedurally similar to Standard
Oil. These decisions hold that, in both judicial and administrative
proceedings, a definitive ruling on a claim, not subject to further
reconsideration, is sufficiently final to invoke review under the Co-
hen principles. Moreover, these decisions recognize that a claim of
abuse of prosecutorial discretion is by its very nature collateral to,
and separable from, the question of guilt or innocence.
In Standard Oil, the Supreme Court perfunctorily rejected the
application of the collateral order doctrine, stating merely that the
issuance of a complaint will merge into the final judgment.109 Com-
parison with Cohen and other cases applying the collateral order
doctrine, however, indicates that review of SOCAL"s claim was
equally appropriate. First, as the Court stated, the FTC's decision
on whether it had reason to believe a violation had occurred was
definitive and would not be reviewed again during the administra-
tive proceeding.110 Thus, even though the FTC's decision was not
the final judgment in the proceeding, it was nonetheless final as to
that issue.1
Berngan, 482 F.2d 171, 175 (3rd Cir. 1973).
106. 348 F.2d 342 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
107. Id. at 344.
108. Id., accord, Jewell Compames, Inc. v. FTC, 432 F.2d 1155 (7th Cir. 1970) (review of
failure to exercise discretion in bringing complaint appropriate on interlocutory appeal); B.
F Goodrich Co. v. FTC, 208 F.2d 829 (D.C. Cir. 1953) (appeal to enjoin enforcement of FTC
Quantity-Limit Rule appropriate). See generally Note, Jurisdiction to Review Administra-
tve Action: District Court or Court of Appeals, 88 HARV. L. REv. 980, 986 (1975).
109. 101 S. Ct. at 496.
110. Id. at 493-94 & n.9. The Court recognized that SOCAL had exhausted its adminis-
trative remedies as well. Id. at 495; see Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651, 659 (1977);
United States v. Griffin, 617 F.2d 1342, 1345 (9th Cir. 1980).
111. Mercantile Nat'l Bank v. Langdeau, 371 U.S. 555, 558 (1963); see notes 77-80 & ac-
companying text supra.
[Vol. 23:139
REASON TO BELIEVE
Second, the FTC decision would not merge into the final judg-
ment. Although whether the FTC had reason to believe is disposi-
tive as to whether the adjudication could proceed at all, the issue
was unrelated to, and separable from, the merits of the case, as
were the orders in Cohen, Abney, Griffin, and Dixon.112 Similarly,
SOCAL challenged the very authority of the government to com-
mence the proceeding. Moreover, review of the FTC decision is
consistent with the purposes behind the separability requirement.
An appellate court will not duplicate its review because, if a cease
and desist order issues, the court reviews only the merits of the
cease and desist order, not the antecedent decision to bring the
complaint.1 38 Furthermore, the separability of the claim permits
the agency adjudication to continue while the judicial appeal is
pursued.1 14
Finally, SOCAL's contention that the FTC violated the law and
issued a complaint for political reasons presents a serious question
that will be lost if postponed until final judgment. Just as in Co-
hen, if review is withheld "it will be too late effectively to review
the. . order, and the rights conferred by the statute, if it is ap-
plicable, will have been lost, probably irreparably."'1 5 As noted
above, the court will not grant immunity to SOCAL to continue to
violate the law if the FTC proves a violation. " ' SOCAL claims a
right to administrative regulation in accordance with the law; judi-
cial review of administrative action assures this right. 17 By failing
to analyze adequately its rejection of SOCAL's claim, and by
mechanically rejecting the application of the Cohen doctrine, the
112. Unfortunately, the Supreme Court has misread, or avoided, the essence of SOCAL's
claim. SOCAL does not attack the FTC decision on the merits. That issue remained to be
adjudicated and would be reviewed upon final judgment. SOCAL argued that the FTC had
not made the decision that a violation had occurred, and that, by failing to exercise its
discretion and issuing its complaint for political reasons without reason to believe that the
law had been violated, the FTC violated the law which authorized it to bring the complaint
m the first place. Thus, like the defendants in Abney, Griffin, and Dixon, SOCAL's claun
challenged "the very authority of the Government to hale [SOCAL] into court to face
trial on the charge against [it]." Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. at 659.
113. See notes 79-80 & accompanying text supra.
114. See notes 64-65 & accompanying text supra.
115. 337 U.S. at 546 (emphasis added).
116. See text accompanying note 77 supra.
117. See Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 413-15 (1971); L.
JAFEE, supra note 1, at 346.
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Court reached a decision that is inconsistent with the purposes of
the collateral order doctrine and has subjected regulated industries
to the possibility of arbitrary administrative action without
redress.
JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT
Section 10 of the Administrative Proceduire Act (APA) governs
judicial review of administrative action. 118 The APA embodies a
presumption of judicial review, providing that any person "suffer-
Ing legal wrong because of agency action, or adversly affected or
aggrieved by agency action is entitled to judicial review." 1  9
Courts will exercise review unless a statute precludes review or the
agency action is committed to agency discretion by law. 20 The Su-
preme Court has held that courts should give the "generous review
provisions" of the APA a "hospitable interpretation, 1 21 and refuse
review only if evidence appears of a clear and convincing intent of
Congress to withhold review.122 Consequently, the threshold ques-
tion of the reviewability of the FTC action in Standard Oil is
whether a statute precludes review. The FTCA does does not con-
tain an express prohibition of judicial review of the FTC's reason
to believe determination. 123 Therefore, the court must determine
whether the agency action is so committed to the FTC's discretion
as to preclude review.124
Rather than addressing the applicability of the presumption in
favor of judicial review, the Court relied upon section 10(c) of the
118. 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706 (1976). See generally 5 B. MEziNEs, supra note 1, § 44.03.
119. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1976); see Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 140 (1967).
120. 5 U.S.C. § 701 (1976).
121. Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 140-41 (1967); Shaughnessy v. Pedreiro, 349
U.S. 48, 51 (1955).
122. Rusk v. Cort, 369 U.S. 367, 379-80 (1962); see Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc.
v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 410 (1971); Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 141 (1967);
Brownell v. We Shung, 352 U.S. 180, 185 (1956). See generally L. JAFmE, supra note 1, at
336-59; Note, Reviewability of Administrative Action: The Eluswe Search for a Pragmatic
Standard, 1974 DuKE L.J. 382.
123. Standard Oil Co. of Cal. v. FTC, 596 F.2d 1381, 1385 (1979); see Abbott Labs. v.
Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 141 (1967). Because no statute specifically proscribes review, the
agency "bears the heavy burden of overcoming the strong presumption that Congress did
not mean to prohibit all judicial review of [the] decision." Dunlop v. Bachowski, 421
U.S. 560, 567 (1975).
124. Standard Oil Co. of Cal. v. FTC, 596 F.2d 1381, 1385 (1979).
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APA to deny judicial review.1 25 Section 10(c) provides that
"[a]gency action made reviewable by statute and final agency ac-
tion for which there is no other adequate remedy in a court are
subject to judicial review."12 6 The Court reasoned that the issuance
of the complaint was not final agency action and that the action
was not reviewable by statute.1 7 Section 10(c), however, should
not have precluded review because the agency had determined
finally whether it had a reason to believe when it issued the com-
plaint.2 8 Moreover, the APA specifically evinces a congressional
intent that claims such as SOCAL's shall be reviewed. Section
20(e) provides that a reviewing court shall hold unlawful and set
aside agency action found to be "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of
discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law; 29 . .. in ex-
cess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or short of a
statutory right;130 [or] without observance of procedure required by
law.,,ls
Thus Congress intended that courts would oversee administra-
tive action such as that alleged by SOCAL. Because the Court's
decision insulates the FTC's action from review at any time,3 2 the
Court's mechanical application of finality criteria ignores a specific
statutory requirement for review. Consequently, the decision con-
flicts with the "hospitable interpretation" that the Supreme Court
has stated courts must give to the review provisions of the APA. 53
125. 101 S. Ct. at 492.
126. 5 U.S.C. § 704 (1976) (emphasis added).
127. 101 S. Ct. at 492-96.
128. See note 46 & accompanying text supra.
129. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1976).
130. Id. § 706(2)(C).
131. Id. § 706(2)()).
132. See notes 75-80 & accompanying text supra.
133. See Leedom v. Kyne, 358 U.S. 184 (1958). The Court stated:
"While an affirmative declaration of duty contained in a legislative enactment
may be of imperfect obligation because not enforceable in terms, a definite
statutory prohibition of conduct which would thwart the declared purpose of
the legislation cannot be disregarded."
"Absence of jurisdiction of the federal courts" would mean a "sacrifice
of a right wich Congress" has given for there is no other means to
protect and enforce that right. This Court cannot lightly infer that Con-
gress does not intend judicial protection of rights it confers against agency ac-
tion taken in excess of delegated powers.
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THE REVIEWABILITY OF THE ISSUANCE OF A COMPLAINT BY THE FTC
A critical issue raised in Standard Oil is whether the language of
the FTCA creates a statutory limitation on the discretion of the
FTC to issue a complaint, or whether such action is so committed
to agency discretion as to preclude judicial review. The question is
not whether the FTC actually abused or failed to exercise its dis-
cretion in bringing the complaint; SOCAL's allegations must be as-
sumed true for the FTC's motion to dismiss.13 4 Rather, the ques-
tion is whether, assuming that SOCAL has made a prima facie case
of institution of proceedings for political reasons, the agency action
can be reviewed. If the action is so committed to agency discretion,
the Court should have so held m order to maintain the integrity of
judicial supervision of the administrative process. If, however, the
statute creates an enforceable right, the Court should have permit-
ted review of the action.
Recent Supreme Court decisions indicate that the FTC's deci-
sion is not committed entirely to agency discretion.135 Courts con-
strue the "committed to agency discretion" exception from judicial
review narrowly.136 The Supreme Court has held that this excep-
tion is applicable only if the discretion committed to the agency is
so broad that the court has "no law to apply ,,i-7 In Standard Oil,
however, there is law to apply because the "shall have reason to
believe" language of the FTCA provides a specific limitation on
FTC discretion.138 The agency must make a determination that it
Id. at 189-90 (quoting Texas & New Orleans R.R. v. Brotherhood of Ry. & S.S. Clerks, 281
U.S. 548, 558 (1929), and Switchmen's Union v. National Mediation Bd., 320 U.S. 297, 300
(1943)). See also Stark v. Wickard, 321 U.S. 288, 307 (1944); Texas & New Orleans R.R. v.
Brotherhood of Ry. & S.S. Clerks, 281 U.S. 548, 569 (1930); Deering Milliken, Inc. v. John-
ston, 295 F.2d 856, 865-66 (4th Cir. 1961).
134. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957).
135. See, e.g., Dunlop v. Bachowski, 421 U.S. 560, 567 (1975).
136. See, e.g., Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 410 (1971).
137. Id. In Overton Park, the plaintiffs challenged a decision by the Secretary of Trans-
portation to build a lghway through Overton Park. A federal statute provided that the
Secretary "shall not approve any program or project" that required use. of public parkland
unless no feasible alternative existed. The Court held that the language of the statute cre-
ated a limitation on the exercise of the Secretary's discretion, and therefore applicable law
existed. Thus, the Secretary's decision was reviewable. Id. at 410-11.
138. See Union Mechling Corp. v. United States, 566 F.2d 722, 725 (D.C. Cir. 1977) ("[I]n
order to have its decision escape review, the Commission must actually exercise its discre-
tion. If an agency simply ignores issues whose relevance to the public interest is obvious, the
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has reason to believe that the law has been violated and may not
issue a complaint based on political factors if it has no reason to
believe a violation has occurred.113  SOCAL alleged facts that pro-
vide a reasonable inference that the FTC violated this limita-
tion,140 and therefore review is appropriate. The question is the
standard of review that the court must exercise.141
The actual determination of whether a "reason to believe" exists
is left to the discretion of the agency, and a court may not substi-
tute its judgment for that of the agency in evaluating the substan-
tive basis for the agency's belief.142 Thus, the scope of review is
narrow."" The court must consider whether the decision actually
agency's decision may be reversed.") (citations omitted); Hunt Foods & Indus., Inc. v. FTC,
286 F.2d 803, 806 (9th Cir. 1961) ("The Commission cannot have 'reason to believe' unless it
is in possession of facts warranting such a belief."); Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc.
v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971); cf. Southern Ry. v. Seaboard Allied Milling Corp., 442 U.S.
444 (1979). Southern Railway involved a challenge to an ICC decision not to investigate
allegedly illegal railroad rate increases. The Court distinguished two clauses of the ICC Act,
49 U.S.C. § 15(8) and § 13(1). See 49 U.S.C. §§ 15(8), 13(1) (1976). Section 15(8) states that
the Commission "may" bring a complaint, and the ICC's failure to do so was the subject of
the suit. The Court held that the "may" language made the agency action discretionary and
therefore unreviewable, adding.
Congress did not use permissive language such as that found in § 15(8)(a)
when it wished to create reviewable duties. Instead, it used mandatory
language [such as that in § 13(1) which] provides that "[i]f there
shall appear to be any reasonable ground for investigating said complaint, it
shall be the duty of the Commission to investigate "
442 U.S. at 456. Clearly, the "shall" language in § 13(1) that the Court finds imposes a
mandatory, reviewable duty is analagous to the "shall have reason to believe" requrement
of 15 U.S.C. § 45(b). See 15 U.S.C. § 45(b) (1976).
139. See, e.g., Pillsbury Co. v. FTC, 354 F.2d 952 (5th Cir. 1966). In Pillsbury the court
set aside an FTC divestiture order that resulted from impermissible political pressure.
[Wihen such [a Congressional] investigation focuses directly and substantially
upon the mental decisional processes of a Commission in a case which is pend-
ing before it, Congress is no longer intervening in the agency's legislative func-
tion, but rather, in its judicial function. At this latter point, we become con-
cerned with the right of private litigants to a fair trial and, equally important,
with their right to the appearance of impartiality, which cannot be maintained
unless those who exercise the judicial function are free from powerful external
influences.
Id. at 964.
140. Standard Oil Co. of Cal. v. FTC, 596 F.2d 1381, 1386 (1979).
141. Id.
142. Id., see Dunlop v. Bachowski, 421 U.S. 560, 572 (1975); Citizens to Preserve Overton
Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971).
143. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971).
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was based upon a consideration of the relevant factors and whether
the FTC reasonably could have believed that a violation of the law
had occurred.14 4 If the court concludes that the agency's determi-
nation has a rational basis, further judicial inquiry is foreclosed. 45
To make an evaluation of the reasonableness of the agency's de-
cision, the court may require the agency to provide a statement of
reasons for its determination. 4" The Supreme Court, however, has
held that affidavits filed by an agency are mere post-hoc rational-
izations and may not constitute an adequate record from which to
review the agency's decision.147 Therefore, if the court lacks a for-
mal record to review, the court may require agency officials to tes-
tify as to their reasons for the decision. 4 8
Thus, the "shall have reason to believe" language of the FTCA
provides law to apply, and SOCAL's claim that the FTC violated
this statutory limitation was reviewable. Moreover, strong policy
reasons support review of claims such as SOCAL's. Abuse of
prosecutorial discretion and arbitrary prosecution conflict with
closely guarded statutory and constitutional guarnatees. Congress
has created specific statutory rights to freedom from action such as
that alleged by SOCAL, both by limiting the agency's discretion
and by directing the courts to review abuse of that discretion. 4"
The courts carefully supervise agency action to assure conformity
with these statutory and procedural norms. 50
144. Id., see Dunlop v. Bachowski, 421 U.S. 560, 572-73 (1975).
145. Dunlop v. Bachowski, 421 U.S. 560, 573 (1975).
146. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 420 (1971); see
Dunlop v. Backowski, 421 U.S. 560, 571-74 (1975).
147. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 421 U.S. 401, 420 (1971).
148. Id. In Morgan v. United States, 313 U.S. 409, 422 (1941), the Court ruled that in-
qury into the mental processes of administrative decisionmakers was prohibited. In Overton
Park, the Court rejected rigid application of that rule, holding that, in cases without formal
findings, testimony by the decisionmakers may be the only way that judicial review can be
exercised. Id. at 420; see note 18 supra.
149. See notes 21-36 & accompanying text supra.
150. See, e.g., Marshall v. Jericho, Inc., 100 S. Ct. 1610 (1980); Leedom v. Kyne, 358 U.S.
184 (1958); Ewing v. Mytinger & Casselberry, Inc., 339 U.S. 594 (1950) (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting); Skinner & Eddy Corp. v. United States, 249 U.S. 557 (1919); Monongahela
Bridge Co. v. United States, 216 U.S. 177 (1910); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886);
Environmental Defense Fund v. Ruckelshaus, 439 F.2d 584 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Deering Milli-
ken, Inc. v. Johnston, 295 F.2d 856 (4th Cir. 1961). See generally 2 K. DAvis, ADMINISTRA-
TiVE LAW TREATISE 215-56 (2d ed. 1979); Comment, Curbing the Prosecutor's Discretion:
United States v. Falk, 9 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 372, 377 (1974).
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Moreover, the Constitution requires that governmental action
not be artitrary or capricious. 151 Due process assures an affirmative
right to neutrality m both civil and criminal proceedings.1 52 The
fundamental principles of procedural due process, the prevention
of unjustified deprivations, and the preservation of fairness and
participation, require agency neutrality and effective judicial su-
pervision to assure that neutrality.1 5 .3
The Supreme Court has stated that "traditions of prosecutorial
discretion do not immunize from judicial scrutiny cases in which
the enforcement decisions of an administrator were motivated by
improper factors or were otherwise contrary to law."" Limitmg
abuse of discretion is fundamental to the integrity of the adminis-
trative process. When this integrity is questioned, courts should re-
quire administrators to provide the reasons for their decisions. 155
Furthermore, courts should require that agencies establish prece-
dents that clearly explain the procedures by which they operate,
and to minimize the appearance of arbitrariness and irrationality
courts should enforce adherence to those procedures.5 8 While such
requirements may inconvenience the agencies, statutory and con-
stitutional guarantees require that a neutral administrative system
be maintained.
CONCLUSION
In FTC v. Standard Oil Co. of Califorma, the Supreme Court
misread the fundamental issue: whether the FTC made a determi-
nation that it had reason to believe that SOCAL violated the law.
Instead, the Court focused on SOCAL's allegations as if SOCAL
attacked the substantive basis for the FTC's finding. If the FTC,
by scrutinizing the relevant factors, actually made the determina-
tion that the FTCA was violated, the sufficiency of the evidence
upon which it made that determination is committed to agency
151. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
152. Marshall v. Jericho, Inc., 100 S. Ct. 1610, 1613 (1980).
153. Id.
154. Id. at 1616-17.
155. 2 K. DAVIs, supra note 150, at 215-56; see Dunlop v. Bachowski, 421 U.S. 560 (1975);
Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971); K. DAvIs, DISCRETION-
ARY JUSTICE: A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY 188-213 (1969).
156. 2 K. DAviS, supra note 150.
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discretion and is unreviewable. 157 Bringing a complaint, however,
without having formulated a reason to believe that the law has
been violated is reviewable and, indeed, is unlawful. By treating
SOCAL's allegations as a challenge on the merits, the Supreme
Court extinguished a crucial statutory claim of right.
The FTC's decision to bring the complaint and its refusal to re-
consider its action should have been considered final agency action
so as to permit review. The decision by the FTC was definitive on
the issue of whether it had reason to believe and was not subject to
reconsideration during the course of the agency adjudication.
Moreover, if the FTC issues a cease and desist order, the courts
will review only the decision on the merits and not the issue of
whether the FTC had reason to believe the law had been violated.
In effect, the Court allowed the FTC to be the final judge of the
legality of its action.
Even if the Court decided that the FTC decision was not final in
the traditional sense, it should have permitted review under the
collateral order doctrine. The allegation that the FTC failed to
comply with the FTCA in issuing the complaint is collateral to the
substantive issue of whether SOCAL violated the FTCA. The deci-
sion does not merge into the final judgement because upon review
of a cease and desist order the Court addresses only the substan-
tive basis for the final order, not the antecedent issue of whether
the FTC violated the FTCA when it brought the complaint.
The decision by the Court is unsettling. By refusing to grant in-
terlocutory review through a mechanical application of finality cri-
teria, the Court insulated agency prosecutorial discretion from ju-
dicial review. This insulation grants the agencies license to
institute politically motivated adjudicative proceedings with impu-
nity The Court's decision is difficult to understand because the
scope of review is narrow and the disruption to agency proceedings
is minimal. In view of the strong policy considerations favoring re-
view of agency abuse of discretion, the Court should have resolved
any doubt in favor of reviewability
A.J.V
157. The action may be reviewable, however, if the agency action clearly was irrational or
capricious. See 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1976).
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